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Abstract: We analyse results from over 3.4million detailed market-trading simulation sessions which collectively 
confirm an unexpected result: in markets with dynamically varying supply and demand, the best-performing 
automated adaptive auction-market trading-agent currently known in the AI/Agents literature, i.e. 
Vytelingum’s Adaptive-Aggressive (AA) strategy, can be routinely out-performed by simpler trading 
strategies. AA is the most recent in a series of AI trading-agent strategies proposed by various researchers 
over the past twenty years: research papers contributing major steps in this evolution of strategies have been 
published at IJCAI, in the Artificial Intelligence journal, and at AAMAS. The innovative step taken here is to 
brute-force exhaustively evaluate AA in market environments that are in various ways more realistic, closer 
to real-world financial markets, than the simple constrained abstract experimental evaluations routinely used 
in the prior academic AI/Agents research literature. We conclude that AA can indeed appear dominant when 
tested only against other AI-based trading agents in the highly simplified market scenarios that have become 
the methodological norm in the trading-agents academic research literature, but much of that success seems 
to be because AA was designed with exactly those simplified experimental markets in mind. As soon as we 
put AA in scenarios closer to real-world markets, modify it to fit those markets accordingly, and exhaustively 
test it against simpler trading agents, AA’s dominance simply disappears. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Automated algorithmic trading systems are a big 
business. In most major financial markets around the 
world, jobs previously done by highly-paid human 
traders are now routinely done by machines, 
autonomous adaptive computational systems that can 
process vast amounts of data and that can act and react 
at speeds that no human is physically capable of 
matching. Commonly referred to as “algo traders” or 
“robot traders”, such automated systems running in 
any one major investment bank might be responsible 
for order-flows of $100Bn or more per working week.  
When it comes to sub-second financial-market 
trading, we Homo Sapiens are simply made from the 
wrong hardware: in the global financial markets, the 
“rise of the robots” has been underway for the past 10 
years or more. And, inside that industry, everybody 
knows the robots won (see e.g. Rodgers, 2016). 
The AI and Autonomous Agents research community 
should be claiming this as a victory, a major 
demonstration of success. If the annual compensation 
(salary and bonuses) paid to someone in a knowledge-
intensive job is even a half-way reasonable indication 
of the intelligence required to do that job, then the fact 
that traders previously paid very high levels of 
compensation have now been replaced by machines 
costing only a tiny fraction of a trader’s salary is 
surely a sign that, in the domain of the financial 
markets, the widespread deployment of artificially 
intelligent “robot trader” autonomous agents is a 
major success story for AI/Agents research. Such a 
claim can be justified by reference to the key 
published literature on adaptive automated trading. 
Although a few significant publications contributing 
to the development of robot-trading systems came 
from academic economists, the landmark papers 
largely appeared in AI and autonomous-agent 
publication venues such as the International Joint 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), the 
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and 
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), the Artificial 
Intelligence journal (AIJ), and in previous ICAART 
papers: Section 2 reviews in more detail eight major 
publications in the development of this field.  
 The review in Section 2 is important, because there 
we trace the way in which the methodology of initial 
experiments published in 1962 by a young economist, 
Vernon Smith (who 40 years later would be awarded 
the Nobel Prize for his empirical research work) have 
since come to be fixed, or fixated upon, in the 
AI/agents literature. Motivated by what it seems fair 
to assume was a well-intentioned desire to show each 
set of the latest results in the context of what had gone 
before, papers that followed Smith’s replicated much 
or all of his 1962 experiment design and analysis. 
And this, it seems, may have led down a dead end.  
The papers reviewed here are a sequence of steps, 
each building on the earlier work, that lead to the most 
recent step: Vytelingum’s 2006 PhD thesis which 
described a trading algorithm called Adaptive 
Aggressive (AA) that, in an AIJ paper (Vytelingum et 
al., 2007), and in subsequent ICAART and IJCAI 
papers (De Luca and Cliff, 2012a, 2012b), was 
demonstrated to be the best-performing public-
domain trading strategy. That is, AA was shown to 
perform better, for a specific definition of “better”, 
than all other notable strategies published in the 
literature up to that time. (It is possible that better 
strategies exist and are being used to profitably trade 
in real financial markets, but for obvious reasons any 
such strategies would be closely-guarded commercial 
secrets: we can only talk with any authority about 
those strategies known in the public domain).  
In this paper we demonstrate that the trading 
capabilities of AA are, when faced with realistic 
market dynamics, in fact really rather limited. While 
AA does very well in the type of minimally-simple 
abstract market experiments that had become the 
norm for evaluating and comparing trading-agent 
algorithms, we argue here that this success is due to 
AA having been seemingly (and perhaps 
subconsciously) designed specifically to address 
features of those abstract experimental markets, 
features that are absent or much more complicated in 
real-world markets. It is as if, somewhere along the 
line, people collectively lost sight of the fact that the 
ultimate test of any automated trading system claimed 
to be relevant to the real-world financial markets is 
simply stated: how much money can it actually make? 
The results presented here demonstrate that, when 
operating in a realistically dynamic market, AA 
routinely makes less money than simpler strategies.  
This paper reports on simulation experiments 
involving more than 3 million independent market 
sessions where AA and various other trading 
strategies interact and compete for limited profits, in 
a market with a Limit Order Book (LOB), the core 
data structure found in real-world financial markets, 
explained further in Section 2.2. We use the free 
open-source BSE LOB-market simulator (BSE, 2012; 
Cliff, 2018) available from GitHub since 2012. Using 
a well-established public-domain market simulator 
makes it easier for other researchers to check, 
replicate, and extend our methods and results. 
After the review of past work in Section 2, in Section 
3 we briefly discuss issues arising, modifications that 
need to be made, to adapt AA from its original design 
(which is extremely well-suited to minimal abstract 
market experiments) over to working in the much 
more realistic environments presented by a 
contemporary market simulator such as BSE. To 
distinguish between the original AA, which does not 
operate in realistic markets, and the version modified 
and extended to work in BSE, we here refer to the 
latter as Modified AA (MAA). We describe our 
methods in Section 4, and our results in Section 5.  
We start in Section 5.1 by replicating the spirit of 
prior work, comparing MAA’s performance to other 
trading agents in a BSE market that is deliberately 
constrained to match the simplifying assumptions and 
constraints of earlier experimental work. After that, 
we explore the effects of removing those simplifying 
assumptions and constraints: we report the resultant 
changes in the relative performance of MAA and 
those other trading strategies active in the market 
alongside it. We find that when the market’s 
underlying supply and demand schedules are 
stationary (i.e., are largely fixed for the course of an 
experiment) or suffer intermittent step-change “price 
shocks”, MAA does as well as all previous 
publications lead us to expect. However, when we 
introduce dynamic variation into the supply and 
demand schedules over the course of individual 
experiments, such that the market’s equilibrium price 
is continuously varying, we then find that MAA’s 
performance degenerates badly. Section 5.2 then 
presents results from experiments where fluctuations 
in the equilibrium price are driven by a price-history 
taken from a real-world asset, for a variety of asset-
classes. We find that these real-world dynamics lead 
MAA to always do worse than simpler strategies.  
Section 6 then discusses these results and concludes 
that the success of MAA seems to be due in large 
extent to “methodological over-fitting”, i.e. to being 
embedded in a research methodology so set on 
repeating the same style of experiments (admirably 
so, because replication is fundamental to validation), 
that it lost sight of what real-world phenomena those 
experiments were intended to be abstract models of. 
MAA does very well in the abstract experimental 
scenarios, but it does so well in comparison to its 
terrible performance in more realistic scenarios that it 
is hard to avoid the conclusion that AA was (perhaps 
subconsciously) designed specifically for those 
 abstract models without much consideration of its 
performance in more realistic environments like 
actual financial markets. Unfortunately for MAA, 
practitioners in real financial markets are not at all 
forgiving of mismatches between models and reality. 
The ultimate message of this paper is that we should 
all be testing our systems in as realistic environments 
as we have reasonable access to. Free access to 
public-domain open-source market simulators such 
as BSE, and to alternatives such as OpEx (De Luca, 
2015) or ExPo (Stotter et al., 2013), coupled with 
cheaply available cloud computing, now makes this 
kind of study much easier for others to replicate. 
2 BACKGROUND 
The 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to 
Vernon Smith, in recognition of Smith’s work in 
establishing and thereafter growing the field of 
Experimental Economics (abbreviated hereafter to 
“ExpEcon”). Smith showed that the microeconomic 
behaviour of human traders interacting within the 
rules of some specified market, known technically as 
an auction mechanism, could be studied empirically, 
under controlled and repeatable laboratory 
conditions, rather than in the noisy messy confusing 
circumstances of real-world markets. The minimal 
laboratory studies could act as useful proxies for 
studying real-world markets of any type, but one 
particular auction mechanism has received the 
majority of attention: the Continuous Double Auction 
(CDA), in which any buyer can announce a bid-price 
at any time and any seller can announce an offer-price 
at any time, and in which at any time any trader in the 
market can accept an offer or bid from a counterparty, 
and thereby engage in a transaction. The CDA is the 
basis of major financial markets worldwide.  
Smith’s initial set of experiments were run in the late 
1950’s, and the results and associated discussion were 
presented in his first paper on ExpEcon, published in 
the highly prestigious Journal of Political Economy 
(JPE) in 1962. It seems plausible to speculate that 
when his JPE paper was published, Smith had no idea 
that it would mark the start of a line of research that 
would eventually result in him being appointed as a 
Nobel laureate. And it seems even less likely that he 
would have foreseen the extent to which the 
experimental methods laid out in that 1962 paper 
would subsequently come to dominate the 
methodology of researchers working to build 
adaptive autonomous trading agents by combining 
tools and techniques from artificial intelligence (AI), 
machine learning (ML), agent-based modelling 
(ABM), and agent-based computational economics 
(ACE). Although not a goal stated at the outset, this 
strand of AI/ML/ABM/ACE research converged 
toward a common aim: specifying an artificial agent, 
an autonomous adaptive trading strategy, that could 
automatically tune its behaviour to different market 
environments, and that could reliably beat all other 
known automated trading strategies, thereby taking 
the crown of being the current best trading strategy 
known in the public domain, i.e., the “dominant 
strategy”. Over the past 20 years the dominant 
strategy crown has passed from one algorithm to 
another. Here, we demonstrate that the current holder 
of the title, Vytelingum’s (2006) AA strategy, does 
not perform nearly so well as was previously believed 
from success in small numbers of simple trials. 
Given that humans who are reliably good at trading 
are generally thought of as being “intelligent” in some 
reasonable sense of the word, the aim to develop ever 
more sophisticated artificial trading systems is clearly 
within the scope of AI research, although some very 
important early ideas came from the economics 
literature: a comprehensive review of relevant early 
research was presented by Cliff (1997). Below in 
Section 2.1 we first briefly introduce eight key 
publications leading to the development of AA; then 
describe key aspects of ExpEcon market models in 
Section 2.2; and then discuss each of the eight key 
publications in more detail in Section 2.3. 
2.1 A Brief History of Trading Agents 
Our story starts with Smith’s 1962 JPE paper. The 
next major step comes 30 years later, with a 
surprising result published in the JPE by Gode and 
Sunder (1993): this popularised a minimally simple 
automated trading algorithm now commonly referred 
to as ZIC. A few years later two closely related 
research papers were published independently and at 
roughly the same time, each written without 
knowledge of the other: the first was a Hewlett-
Packard Labs technical report by Cliff (1997) 
describing the adaptive AI/ML trading-agent strategy 
known as the ZIP algorithm; the second summarised 
the PhD thesis work of Gjerstad, in a paper co-
authored with his PhD advisor (Gjerstad and 
Dickhaut 1998), describing an adaptive trading 
algorithm now widely known simply as GD.  
After graduating his PhD, Gjerstad worked at IBM’s 
TJ Watson Labs where he helped set up an ExpEcon 
laboratory that his IBM colleagues used in a study 
that generated world-wide media coverage when the 
results were published by Das et al. at IJCAI-2001. 
This paper presented results from studies exploring 
the behaviour of human traders interacting with GD 
and ZIP robot traders, in a CDA with a Limit Order 
Book (LOB: explained in more detail in Section 2.2, 
below), and demonstrated that both GD and ZIP 
reliably outperformed human traders. Neither GD nor 
 ZIP had been designed to work with the LOB, so the 
IBM team modified both strategies for their study. A 
follow-on 2001 paper by Tesauro and Das (two co-
authors of the IBM IJCAI paper) described a more 
extensively Modified GD (MGD) strategy, and later 
Tesauro and Bredin (2002) described the GD 
eXtended (GDX) strategy. Both MGD and GDX were 
each claimed to be the strongest-known public-
domain trading strategies at the times of their 
publication.  
Subsequently, Vytelingum’s 2006 thesis introduced 
the Adaptive Aggressive (AA) strategy which, in an 
AIJ paper (Vytelingum et al., 2007), and in later 
ICAART and IJCAI papers (De Luca and Cliff 2012a, 
2012b), was shown to be dominant over ZIP, GDX, 
and human traders. Thus far then, AA holds the title.  
However Vach (2015) recently presented results from 
experiments with the OpEx market simulator (De 
Luca, 2015), in which AA, GDX, and ZIP were set to 
compete against one another, and in which the 
dominance of AA is questioned: Vach’s results 
indicate that whether AA dominates or not can be 
dependent on the ratio of AA:GDX:ZIP in the 
experiment: for some ratios, Vach found AA to 
dominate; for other ratios, it was GDX. Vach studied 
only a relatively small sample from the space of 
possible ratios, but his results prompted the work 
reported here, in which we exhaustively sample a 
wide range of differing ratios of four trading 
strategies (AA, ZIC, ZIP, and the minimally simple 
SHVR strategy described in Section 2.2), doing a 
brute-force search for situations in which AA is 
outperformed by the other strategies. The 
combinatorics of such a search are quite explosive, 
and in Section 5 we report on results from over 3.4 
million individual simulations of market sessions. 
Our findings indicate that Vach’s observation was 
correct: AA’s dominance depends on how many other 
AA traders are in the market; and, in aggregate, AA 
is routinely outperformed by ZIP and by SHVR.  
2.2 On Laboratory Models of Markets 
Smith’s early experiments were laboratory models of 
so called open-outcry trading pits, a common sight in 
any real financial exchange before the arrival of 
electronic trader-terminals in the 1970s. In a trading 
pit, human traders huddle together and shout out their 
bids and offers, and also announce their willingness 
to accept a counterparty’s most recent shout. It’s a 
chaotic scene, now largely consigned to the history 
books. In the closing quarter of the 20th Century, 
traders moved en masse to interacting with each other 
instead via electronic means: traders “shouted” their 
offer or bids or acceptances by typing orders on 
keyboards and then sending those orders to a central 
server that would display an aggregate summary of 
all orders currently “shouted” onto the market. That 
aggregate summary is very often in the form of a 
Limit Order Book or LOB: the LOB shows a 
summary of all bids and offers currently live in the 
market. At its simplest, the LOB is a table of numbers, 
divided into the bid side and the ask side (also known 
as the offer side). Both sides of the LOB show the best 
price at the top, with less good prices arranged below 
in numeric order of price: for the bid side this means 
the highest-priced bid at the top with the remaining 
bid prices displayed in descending order below; and 
for the ask side the lowest-priced offer is at the top, 
with the remaining offers arranged in ascending order 
below. The arithmetic mean of the best bid and best 
ask prices is known as the mid-price, and their 
difference is the spread. For each side of the LOB, at 
each price on the LOB, the quantity available on that 
side at that price is also indicated, but with no 
indication of who the relevant orders came from: in 
this sense the LOB serves not only to aggregate all 
currently live orders, but also to anonymize them.  
Traders in LOB-based markets can usually cancel 
existing orders to delete them from the LOB. In a 
common simple implementation of a LOB, traders 
can accept the current best bid or best offer by issuing 
a quote that crosses the spread: i.e., by issuing an 
order that, if added to the LOB, would result in the 
best bid being at a higher price than the best ask. 
Rather than be added to the LOB, if a bid order 
crosses the spread then it is matched with the best 
offer on the ask side (known as lifting the ask), 
whereas an ask that crosses the spread is matched 
with the best bid (hitting the bid); and in either case a 
transaction then occurs between the trader that had 
posted the best price on the relevant side of the LOB, 
and the trader that crossed the spread. The price of the 
resulting transaction is whatever price was hit or 
lifted from the top of the LOB.  
Smith’s earliest experiments pre-dated the arrival of 
electronic trading in real financial markets, and so 
they can be thought of as laboratory models of open-
outcry trading pits. Even though the much later work 
by Gode and Sunder, Cliff, Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 
and Vytelingum all came long after the introduction 
of electronic LOBs in real markets, these academic 
studies all stuck with Smith’s original methodology, 
of modelling open-outcry markets (often by 
essentially operating a LOB with the depth fixed at 1, 
so the only information available to traders is the 
current best, or most recent, bid and ask prices).  
Nevertheless, the studies by IBM researchers (Das et 
al., 2001; Tesauro and Das, 2001; Tesauro and Bredin 
2012), and also the replication and confirmation of 
AA results by De Luca and Cliff (2011a, 2011b) and 
 by Stotter et al. (2013), all used LOB-based market 
simulators. The IBM simulator Magenta seems to 
have been proprietary to IBM; developed at TJ 
Watson Labs and not available for third-party use. 
But De Luca made an open-source release of his 
OpEx simulator (De Luca, 2015) which was 
subsequently used by Vach (2015) in the studies that 
prompted our work reported here. Also of relevance 
here is the ExPo simulator described by Stotter et al. 
(2014): in the work by De Luca, by Vach, and by 
Stotter et al., Vytelingum’s original AA needed 
modifications to make it work in a LOB-based market 
environment: this is discussed further in Section 3.  
In the work reported here we used neither OpEx nor 
ExPo, but instead BSE (BSE, 2012; Cliff, 2018) 
which is another open-source ExpEcon market 
simulator, initially developed as a teaching aid but 
subsequently used as a platform for research (see, e.g. 
le Calvez and Cliff, 2018). BSE has the advantage of 
being relatively lightweight (a single Python script of 
c.2500 lines) and hence readily deployable over large 
numbers of virtual machines in the cloud. BSE 
maintains a dynamically updated LOB and also 
publishes a tape, a time-ordered record of all orders 
that have been executed. It comes with pre-defined 
versions of ZIC and ZIP, and also some additionally 
minimally-simple non-adaptive trading strategies that 
can be used for benchmarking against other more 
complex strategies added by the user. One of these, 
the Shaver strategy (referred to in BSE by the “ticker 
symbol” SHVR) simply reads the best prices on the 
LOB and, if it is able to do so without risking a loss-
making deal then it issues an order that improves the 
current best bid or best ask by one penny/cent.  
2.3 Eight Key Papers, One Methodology 
2.3.1 Smith 1962 
Smith’s 1962 JPE paper is widely regarded as the first 
published study in ExpEcon. In it he reported on 
experiments in which groups of human subjects were 
randomly assigned to be either buyers or sellers.  
Buyers were given a supply of artificial money, and 
sellers were given one or more identical items, of no 
intrinsic value, to sell. Each trader in the market was 
assigned a private valuation, a secret limit price: for a 
buyer this was the price above which he or she should 
not pay when purchasing an item; for a seller this was 
the price below which he or she should not sell an 
item. These limit-price assignments model the client 
orders executed by sales traders in real financial 
markets; we’ll refer to them just as assignments in the 
rest of this paper. After the allocation of assignments 
to all subjects, they then interacted via an open-outcry 
CDA while Smith and his assistants made notes on 
the sequence of events that unfolded during the 
experiment: typically, buyers would gradually 
increase their bid-prices, and sellers would gradually 
lower their offer-prices (also known as ask-prices) 
until transactions started to occur. Eventually, 
typically after 5 or 10 minutes, the experimental 
market reached a position in which no more trades 
could take place, which marked the end of a trading 
period or “trading day” in the experiment; any one 
experiment typically ran for n=5-10 periods, with all 
the traders being resupplied with money and items-
for-sale at the start of each trading period. The 
sequence of n contiguous trading periods (or an 
equivalently long single-period experiment with 
continuous replenishment, as discussed in Section 
5.1) is referred to here as one market session. Smith 
could induce specific supply and demand curves in 
these experimental markets by appropriate choices of 
the various limit-prices he assigned to the traders. As 
any high-school student of microeconomics knows, 
the market’s theoretical equilibrium price (denoted 
hereafter by P0) is given by the point where the supply 
curve and the demand curve intersect. Smith found 
that, in these laboratory CDA markets populated with 
only remarkably small groups of human traders, 
transaction prices could reliably and rapidly converge 
on the theoretical P0 value despite the fact that each 
human trader was acting purely out of self-interest 
and knew only the limit price that he or she had been 
assigned. Smith’s analysis of his results focused on a 
statistic that he referred to as a, the root mean square 
(RMS) deviation of actual transaction prices from the 
P0 value over the course of an experiment. In his early 
experiments, P0  was fixed for the duration of any one 
experiment; in later work Smith explored the ability 
of the market to respond to “price shocks” where, in 
an experiment of N trading days, on a specific day 
S<N the allocation of limit prices would be changed, 
altering P0 from the value that had been in place over 
trading periods 1, 2, …, S, to a different value of P0 
that would then remain constant for the rest of the 
experiment, i.e. in trading periods S+1, S+2, …, N. 
For brevity, in the rest of this paper Smith’s style of 
experiments will be referred to as S’62 experiments.   
2.3.2 ZIC: Gode and Sunder 1993 
Gode and Sunder’s 1993 JPE paper used the S’62 
methodology, albeit with the CDA markets being 
electronic (a move Smith himself had made in his 
experiments many years earlier), so each trader was 
sat at a personal terminal, a computer screen and 
keyboard, from which they received all information 
about the market and via which they announced their 
orders, their bids or offers, to the rest of the traders in 
the experiment. Gode and Sunder first conducted a set 
of experiments in which all the traders were human, 
to establish baseline statistics. Then, all the human 
 traders were replaced with automated trading 
systems, absolute-zero minimally-simple algo traders 
which Gode and Sunder referred to as Zero 
Intelligence (ZI) traders. Gode and Sunder studied 
markets populated with two type of ZI trader: ZI-
Unconstrained (ZIU), which simply generated 
random prices for their bids or offers, regardless of 
whether those prices would lead to profitable 
transactions or to losses; and ZI-Constrained (ZIC), 
which also generated random order prices but were 
constrained by their private limit prices to never 
announce prices that would lead them to loss-making 
deals. Gode and Sunder used fixed supply and 
demand schedules in each experiment, i.e. there were 
no price-shocks in their experiments.  
Not surprisingly, the market dynamics of ZIU traders 
were nothing more than noise. But the surprising 
result in Gode and Sunder’s paper was the revelation 
that a commonly used metric of market price 
dynamics known as allocative efficiency (AE, 
hereafter) was essentially indistinguishable between 
the human markets and the ZIC markets. Because AE 
had previously been seen as a marker of the degree to 
which the traders in a market were behaving 
intelligently, the fact that ZIC traders scored AE 
values largely the same as humans was a shock. Gode 
and Sunder proposed that a different metric should 
instead be used as a marker of the intelligence of 
traders in the market. This metric was profit 
dispersion (PD, hereafter) which measures the 
difference between the profit each trader accrued in 
an experiment, compared to the profit that would be 
expected for that trader if every transaction in the 
market had taken place at the market’s theoretical 
equilibrium price P0: humans typically showed very 
low values of PD (which is assumed to be good) while 
ZIC traders did not. On this basis, Gode and Sunder 
argued that PD should be used in preference to AE.  
2.3.3 ZIP: Cliff 1997 
Taking direct inspiration from both Smith’s work and 
from the ZI paper by Gode and Sunder, Cliff (1997) 
developed a ZI trading strategy that used simple 
machine-learning techniques to continuously adapt 
the randomly-generated prices quoted by the traders: 
this strategy, known as ZI-Plus (ZIP) was 
demonstrated to show human-like market dynamics 
in experiments with flat supply and/or demand 
curves: Cliff also showed theoretical analyses and 
empirical results which demonstrated that transaction 
prices in markets populated only by ZIC traders 
would not converge to the theoretical equilibrium 
price when the supply and/or demand curves are flat 
(or, in the language of microeconomics, “perfectly 
elastic”). ExpEcon studies in which the supply and/or 
demand curve was flat had previously been reported 
by Smith and others, but Gode and Sunder had not 
explored the response of their ZIC traders to this style 
of market. Cliff’s work involved no human traders: 
all the focus was on markets populated entirely by 
autonomous agents, by ZIP traders. In total Cliff 
(1997) reported on fewer than 1,000 simulated market 
sessions. The focus on homogenous markets can 
fairly be interpreted as continuing the tradition 
established by Gode and Sunder (who studied 
markets homogeneously populated with either 
human, ZIU, or ZIC traders) and by Smith (who 
studied all-human markets).  In all other regards Cliff 
continued the S’62 tradition: key metrics were 
Smith’s a, AE, and PD.   
2.3.4 GD: Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1997 
Gjerstad’s PhD studies of price formation in CDA 
markets (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998) also involved 
creating an algorithm that could trade profitably by 
adapting its behavior over time, in response to market 
events. In contrast to the ZI work, Gjerstad’s trading 
algorithm uses frequentist statistics, gradually 
constructing and refining a belief function that 
estimates the likelihood for a bid or offer to be 
accepted in the market at any particular time, 
mapping from price of the order to its probability of 
success. Gjerstad did not explicitly name his strategy, 
but it has since become known as the GD strategy. In 
all other regards, as with Cliff (1997) and Gode and 
Sunder (1993), Gjerstad’s work was firmly in the 
S’62 tradition: homogenous markets of GD traders 
interacting in a CDA, buying and selling single items, 
with the metrics being Smith’s a, AE, and PD. 
2.3.5 MGD: IBM 2001 
In their landmark 2001 IJCAI paper, IBM researchers 
Das, Hanson, Kephart, and Tesauro studied the 
performance of GD and ZIP in a series of ExpEcon 
market experiments where, for the first time ever in 
the same market, some of the traders were robots 
while others were human (recall that the earlier work 
of Smith, of Gode and Sunder, of Cliff, and of 
Gjerstad and Dickhaut had all studied homogeneous 
markets: either all-human or all-robot). Das et al. 
used a LOB-based market simulator called Magenta, 
developed by Gjerstad, and ran a total of six 
experiments, six market sessions, in which humans 
and robots interacted and where there were three 
shock-changes to P0, i.e. four phases in any one 
experiment, each phase with a different P0 value that 
was held static over that phase. The surprising result 
in this paper was that robot trading strategies could 
consistently outperform human traders, by significant 
margins: a result that attracted worldwide media 
attention. Both GD and ZIP outperformed human 
traders, and in the six experiments reported by Das et 
 al. the results from the two robot strategies are so 
similar as to not obviously be statistically significant. 
A subsequent paper by IBM’s Tesauro and Das 
(2001), reported on additional studies in which a 
Modified GD (MGD) strategy was exhibited what the 
authors described in the abstract of their paper as 
“…the strongest known performance of any 
published bidding strategy”.  
2.3.6 GDX: Tesauro and Bredin 2002 
Extensions to MGD were reported by IBM 
researchers Tesauro and Bredin (2002) at AAMAS 
2002. This described extensions to MGD, using 
dynamic programming methods: this version was 
named GDX and its performance was evaluated when 
competing in heterogenous markets with ZIP and 
other strategies. Tesauro and Bredin reported that 
GDX outperformed the other strategies and claimed 
in the abstract of their paper that GDX “...may offer 
the best performance of any published CDA bidding 
strategy.”  
2.3.7 AA: Vytelingum 2006 
Vytelingum developed AA and documented it in full 
in his PhD thesis (2006) and in a major paper in the 
AIJ (Vytelingum et al., 2008). The internal 
mechanisms of AA are described in greater detail in 
Section 3 of this paper. Although Vytelingum’s work 
came a few years after the IBM publications reviewed 
in Sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, the discussion within 
Vytelingum’s publications is phrased very much in 
terms of the S’62 methodology: the P0 value in his AA 
experiments was either fixed for the duration of each 
market session, or was subjected to a single “price 
shock” partway through the session (as described in 
Section 2.3.1); and again the primary metrics studied 
are Smith’s a, AE, and PD. Vytelingum presented 
results from heterogeneous market experiments 
where AA, GDX, and ZIP traders were in 
competition, and the published results indicated that 
AA outperformed both GDX and ZIP by small 
margins. In total, results from c.25,000 market 
sessions are presented in (Vytelingum et al., 2008).   
2.3.8 AA Dominates: De Luca and Cliff 2011 
As part of the research leading to his 2015 PhD thesis, 
De Luca used his LOB-based OpEx market simulator 
system (De Luca, 2012) to study the performance of 
AA in heterogeneous market experiments where 
some of the traders were AA, some were other robot 
strategies such as ZIP, and some were human traders 
sat at terminals interacting with the other traders 
(human and robot) in the market via the OpEx GUI, 
in the style introduced by the IBM team in their IJCAI 
2001 paper. De Luca and Cliff (2011a) had previously 
published results from comparing GDX and AA in 
OpEx, at ICAART-2011, and the first results from 
AA in human-agent studies were then published in a 
2011 IJCAI paper (De Luca and Cliff, 2011b), in 
which AA was demonstrated to dominate not only 
humans but also GDX and ZIP. For consistency with 
what was by then a well-established methodology, in 
De Luca’s experiments the P0 value was static for 
sustained periods with occasional “shock” step-
changes to different values. Continuing the tradition 
established by the IBM authors, the abstract of (De 
Luca and Cliff 2011b) claimed supremacy for AA: 
“We… demonstrate that AA’s performance against 
human traders is superior to that of ZIP, GD, and 
GDX. We therefore claim that… AA may offer the best 
performance of any published bidding strategy”.  
And, until the publication of Vach (2015), that claim 
appeared to be plausibly true.  
3 MAA: MODIFIED AA 
Taking the AA algorithm and attempting to run it in a 
LOB-based market reveals the extent to which AA 
seems designed to fit very well in the Smith’62 style 
of experiments with periodic replenishment, and is 
less well suited to a continuously varying market 
dynamic. In brief, AA’s internal mechanisms revolve 
around three questions that each AA trader attempts 
to answer: (1) What is my best estimate of the current 
equilibrium price P0? (2) What is my best estimate of 
the current volatility of transaction prices around P0? 
And (3) is the limit price on my current assignment 
intramarginal (i.e., could be sold/bought at P0 and still 
make a profit) or extramarginal? For its estimate of 
P0, the original AA trader computes a moving average 
of recent transaction prices. For its volatility estimate, 
it computes Smith’s a metric, taking the difference 
between recent transaction prices and the trader’s 
current estimate of P0 (i.e., ignoring any trend in P0, 
which is safe to do if, as in the S’62 experiments, P0 
changes rarely or never). Deciding on whether the 
current assignment is intra/extra marginal is done by 
comparing its limit price to its P0 estimate.  
In MAA, our modified implementation of AA, these 
questions can instead each be answered by reference 
to information that is routinely available from an 
exchange: the LOB and the exchange’s “tape” (the 
record of timestamped transactions). P0 can be better 
estimated by using the volume-weighted mid-price at 
the top of the book (known as the microprice): this is 
a better metric because it can be sensitive to shifts in 
the P0 value before any transactions go through that 
reflect the shift. Volatility can be estimated by 
reference not to only the current estimate of P0 but 
also to BSE’s tape data: a time-series of transaction-
price values correlated with a time series of 
 microprice values is better to use in situations where 
the P0 value is continuously changing: for each 
transaction on the tape, the microprice at the time of 
that transaction (or immediately before) is the better 
reference value for calculating Smith’s a. Extra-
/intra-marginality is still decided by reference to the 
trader’s P0 estimate, but in MAA that estimate can 
come from the microprice.  
Previous authors have also needed to adapt AA for 
LOB-based markets: De Luca (2011a, 2011b, 2015) 
and Vach (2015) each used AA in the OpEx 
simulator, and Stotter et al. (2013) used AA in the 
ExPo simulator. However, the modified AA proposed 
here is novel insofar as prior authors don’t report 
using the exchange’s tape data or the microprice.  
There is a tension between modifiying AA in an 
attempt to better fit it to a LOB-based market, and 
making claims about AA’s poor performance in those 
markets: the more heavily AA is modified, the more 
one is open to accusations that the modifications 
themselves are the cause of the poor performance, 
rather than that poor performance being a reflection 
of the original AA being badly-suited to LOB 
markets. For that reason, in this paper, we keep AA 
very close to the original, using only the microprice 
modification in generating the results presented here.  
4 EVALUATION METHODS 
Having modified AA to run in the more realistic CDA 
market scenarios provided by BSE, we evaluated its 
performance, measured as average profitability per 
trader, when tested against other trading strategies 
under a variety of supply and demand schedules, in 
markets of varying population sizes; and, for any one 
population size, testing across an exhaustive sequence 
of strategy-ratios (described in Section 4.1). In the 
experiments reported here, we chose to test AA 
against three other strategies: Gode and Sunder’s 
(1993) ZIC (see Section 2.3.2); Cliff’s (1997) ZIP 
(Section 2.3.3); and the BSE built-in strategy SHVR 
(Section 2.2). ZIC serves as a lower-limit non-
adaptive baseline strategy, albeit one that ignores all 
information available on the LOB; SHVR as a 
minimally simple non-adaptive strategy that does 
actually use LOB data; and ZIP, also pre-coded into 
BSE, was argued by Vytelingum to be outperformed 
by AA; and was argued by Tesauro and Bredin to be 
outperformed by  GDX: so if AA cannot do better 
than ZIP in a specific type of experiment then it 
presumably also cannot do better than GDX.  
For brevity, the only metric that we discuss here for  
any given strategy, for any one trial or for aggregate 
results of multiple trials, is the average profit per 
trader (APPT) calculated across all traders playing 
that particular strategy, and the associated stddev.  
4.1 Varying Trader-Strategy Ratios 
The results published by Vach (2015) demonstrated 
that the measured performance of AA in a 
heterogeneous market (i.e. a market populated by 
trading agents with a variety of trading strategies) 
could be heavily dependent on the ratios of the 
various strategies active in the market. To control for 
this, in the experiments reported here we evaluate the 
performance of trading strategies by calculating 
summary statistics that aggregate over a large number 
of trials for any given ratio of the various trading 
strategies in the market: let T represent the number of 
trials we perform for any one ratio of trading 
strategies, and let S represent the number of different 
strategies we are testing in an experiment. We 
systematically and exhaustively vary the ratios of the 
different trading strategies in the market for a given 
total number of traders in the market, which we refer 
to as the population size P, which in turn is 
determined by the number NEqR of traders running 
each strategy when the ratio is equal across all 
strategies, such that P=2·S·NEqR. This is best 
illustrated with an example: in Section 5 we report on 
experiments with MAA, SHVR, ZIC, and ZIP, so 
S=4. Then let R  denote the ratio between the different 
trader types, such that R = MAA:SHVR:ZIC:ZIP. 
If we set NEqR to 3, that means when the ratio R is 
equal, it will be 3:3:3:3 on the buyer side (and 3:3:3:3 
on the seller side), so there will be S·NEqR=3x4=12 
traders on each side, so P=24. When we say that we 
are exhaustively varying the ratios, this means that for 
any given number of buyer or seller traders P/2, we 
test all possible ratios for that given P/2, sweeping the 
counts of each trader-type in R through all valid 
nonnegative integers. Taking again the P=24 example 
from our experiments in Section 5, this means starting 
with R=0:0:0:12 on each side of the market, running 
T trials (independent market sessions) at that ratio, 
then running T trials at R=0:0:1:11, a further T at 
R=0:0:2:10, and so on systematically adjusting all 
counts in the ratio, through the equal-ration case of 
R=3:3:3:3 and on to the final ratio of R=12:0:0:0. 
The combinatorics are quite explosive: for any 
particular values of S and NEqR, total number of 
different viable ratios R is given by: 
R = (S·NEqR + S – 1)! / ((S·NEqR)! · (S-1)!)   
Hence the total number of market sessions that need 
to be run for any one value of NEqR is R·T. This gets 
quite big, quite fast: e.g., with S=4, NEqR=4, and 
T=100, we have R·T=96,900. And to rigorously 
explore population-size effects we sweep NEqR 
through a range of values. 
 4.2 Varying Supply/Demand Schedules 
The review in Section 2.3 demonstrated that typically 
the supply and demand schedules induced by the 
experimenter (via the choice of limit prices in the 
traders’ assignments) are such that the equilibrium 
price P0 is either constant for the duration of the 
experiment, or undergoes one or more step-changes, 
(price shocks) in the course of the experiment, 
jumping from one constant value to another. Much of 
the work reviewed in Section 2.3 also involves 
periodic replenishment of all traders’ assignments, 
dividing the experiment into a number of trading 
“periods”. While this style of experiment design will 
certainly have been most convenient for Vernon 
Smith when he was running his early experiments, 
entirely manually, in the late 1950s and 1960s, once 
everything is under computer control it seems a 
curious thing way to organise things, especially given 
the observation that almost every real-world market 
of interest is quite clearly not fixed at a constant 
equilibrium price, undergoes step-changes in P0 only 
very rarely (if at all) and that in the course of a trading 
day for any reasonably liquid tradeable asset the flow 
of orders (i.e., trader assignments) into the market is 
not neatly periodic but instead is best modelled as a 
stochastic process, with random interarrival times. 
Fortunately, BSE offers the experimenter a lot of 
control over the supply and demand schedules (SDSs) 
used in any one experiment. Traditional ExpEcon 
constant-P0  SDSs can easily be specified in BSE, 
with or without step changes so that P0 jumps from 
one constant value to another, but BSE also allows for 
constantly-varying SDSs to be specified, driven by 
closed-form functions or by look-up tables (LUTs) 
which each specify an offset value, denoted P0+(t)  
that is added to P0 at time t  during the experiment. To 
study the response of MAA to continuously-varying 
P0, we used LUTs of real-world financial-asset intra-
day time-series drawn from a range of asset classes, 
as described in Section 5.2: in these experiments the 
supply and demand curves were totally flat, with all 
supply-curve limit prices PS=P0+(t) + $0.95 and all 
demand-curve prices PS=P0+(t) + $1.05. In contrast, 
in the S’62 experiments reported in Section 5.1, the 
SDSs were constant (P0+(t)=0 for all time) and 
symmetric over the range $0.10 to $1.90. 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Experiments in the style of Smith’62 
Our first set of S’62 experiments explores the 
profitability of MAA, SHVR, ZIC, and ZIP in market 
experiments run within BSE but modelled as closely 
as possible on Smith’s original experiments: 
individual traders are either buyers or sellers; trading 
happens in discrete periods (“days”), with all traders’ 
assignments of buy and sell orders being 
simultaneously replenished at the start of each period. 
The SDS are such that the underlying equilibrium 
price P0 is held fixed for the duration of the 
experiment, or is subjected to one or more step-
change “price shocks” which always occur at the start 
of a trading period. Figure 1 shows a comparison of 
the results, expressed as average profit per trader 
(APPT) from markets populated by a mix of MAA 
and ZIP traders, in ratios varying from roughly 
5%:95% through 50%:50% to 95%:5%.  
 
 
Figure 1: Results from 7,800 separate S’62 market sessions 
pitting some number of MAA traders against some number 
of ZIP traders, in markets where the total number of traders 
varies from 8 (4 buyers + 4 sellers) to 48 (24+24). Upper 
graph is MAA results; lower graph is ZIP. Horizontal axis 
is percentage of that strategy within the population; vertical 
axis is average profit per trader (APPT). Small blue markers 
are results from individual market sessions; large solid-red 
markers show the mean, with error bars to plus and minus 
one standard deviation, for quintile bins (i.e., 0-20%, 20%-
40%, etc). For both strategies, when in the minority the 
results are broadly similar, but when MAA is in the majority 
it scores significantly higher profit than MAA.  
This is exactly the kind of comparison that is usually 
reported in the trading-agent literature. From Figure 
1 it is clear that, for both MAA and ZIP, when either 
strategy is in the minority (<50% of the traders in the 
population), the profit scores are roughly the same; 
but as the proportion increases beyond 50%, MAA’s 
profit scores are significantly better than those of ZIP. 
MAA  
ZIP  
 The data in Figure 1 should cause no surprises to 
anyone familiar with the literature surveyed in 
Section 2.3: this is confirmation that MAA can 
outperform ZIP, which is to be expected from the 
results and analysis previously published by 
Vytelingum and by De Luca and Cliff. AA’s 
dominance is clearest when it is trading in markets 
where most other traders are also using the MAA 
strategy. Thus far though, the king retains the crown.  
While Figure 1 shows the effect of varying the 
proportion of two trading strategies in a two-trader 
market, summarising results from 7,800 separate 
market sessions, the number of different situations 
studied there is very small in comparison to the space 
of all viable ratios across some reasonable range of 
population sizes. Figure 2 illustrates aggregate 
statistics from 546,000 market sessions that 
exhaustively explore that whole space. Here the ratios 
of four strategies are systematically varied over all 
viable values (so this includes the data shown in 
Figure 1, where the MAA:SHVR:ZIC:ZIP ratio R 
was restricted to match n:0:0:m). Figure 2 shows 
APPT for the four trading strategies plotted as NEqR 
varies over the range [1,6] (i.e., total number of 
traders in the range [8, 48]), with T=100 at each ratio.  
It is clear from Figure 2 that as NEqR increases there 
is a slight reduction in variance; and although the 
mean values of the four trader types differ, these 
differences are tiny in comparison to the standard 
deviations: when measured by APPT there are no 
major differences when the whole space is sampled.  
 
Figure 2: Results from 546,000 separate S’62 market 
sessions with periodic replenishment of traders’ 
assignments. Horizontal axis is NEqR values; vertical axis 
is APPT, with error bars at plus and minus one standard 
deviation. The explosive combinatorics of the exhaustive 
sweep through all combinations of ratios of the four trader 
types for any specific value of NEqR means that the number 
n of discrete experiments summarised by each marker on 
the graph for NEqR=1,2,…,6 are respectively: n=2,000; 
12,000; 36,400; 81,600; 154,000; and 260,000. 
This may seem like a counterintuitive result: in these 
experiments the zero-intelligence ZIC and SHVR are 
scoring just as well as MAA and ZIP. It can be 
explained by reference to three factors: choice of 
metric; heterogenous trader populations; and 
experiment design. On the choice of metric: if we had 
reported the traditional metrics of Smith’s a or PD, 
the differences between strategies would have been 
more clear; transaction prices in markets populated by 
ZIC and SHVR do show increased a (i.e., RMS 
deviation of transaction prices from the theoretical P0 
value) and PD (i.e., differences between actual profit 
accrued, and profit expected if all transactions took 
place at the P0 price), but as was argued above, the 
bottom line in a real-world trading environment is 
actual profit. On the heterogeneity of the trading 
population: in almost all of the market sessions 
summarised in Figure 1, the “dumb” traders playing 
the SHVR strategy can, in essence, get a free-ride 
from the AI/ML in MAA and ZIP: as traders playing 
those “intelligent” strategies post prices, SHVR 
traders can parasitically jump one cent better, 
immediately posting a better price, positioning 
themselves at the top of the LOB. On the experiment 
design, this classic SDS where the P0 is static for the 
entire experiment does not exactly provide the most 
taxing environment in which to trade; in the rest of 
this paper we test the strategies in more challenging 
environments, and the differences in their 
performance come much more starkly into view.  
 
 
Table 1: Results table for S’62 experiments with periodic 
(upper sub-table: PR) and continuous (lower sub-table: CR) 
replenishment of trader assignments for NEqR=1…5. Each 
sub-table shows the sample mean µ and standard deviation 
s of the APPT scores for the four strategies. The µ values 
of the four strategies are so tightly clustered, relative to the 
s values, that the differences between the µ values are of no 
consequence. The column N is the total number of separate 
market sessions run for that sub-table.  
Our second set of S’62 experiments uses the same 
SDS as our first, but we switch from periodically 
updating all trader’s assignments at the same time, at 
the start of each trading period or “day”, and instead 
have assignments made continuously, arriving at 
random during the course of the experiment which 
has the same overall duration but is no longer sensibly 
spoken about as being divided into distinct periods. 
To save space, we will move from graphical 
 presentation of results to tabular. Table 1 presents the 
numeric values shown graphically in Figure 2 from 
our periodic-replenishment (PR) experiment, along 
with the corresponding values from the same 
experiment, same SDS, run with continuous-
replenishment (CR). As can be seen, the move to CR 
(which is much closer to real-world markets) has no 
impact on the rank-ordering of the strategies. 
5.2 Real-World-Dynamics Experiments 
To explore whether AA dominates in more realistic 
environments, a set of experiments were run where 
the market’s underlying equilibrium price was varied 
dynamically using an appropriate P0+(t) function with 
the SDS, as described in Section 4.2.  
A first set of experiments, involving 858,000 
simulated market sessions, was run where P0+(t) was 
generated from a closed-form sinusoidal function. 
Results from these experiments (not presented here, 
due to space constraints) indicated that MAA did not 
do well in such circumstances, but were open to the 
criticism that the P0+(t) functions involved were too 
artificial, too unlike real-world dynamics. For that 
reason, a second set of 1,716,000 experiments were 
run, referred to here as Real-World Dynamics 
(RWD). In the RWD experiments, P0+(t) was 
determined by a LUT of intra-day price movements 
of a specific real financial asset on a particular date. 
In an attempt at mitigating any biases in the dynamics 
of a particular asset class, we ran sets of RWD 
experiments using intra-day price data from six 
different classes of asset: an equity; a foreign-
exchange (FX) currency-pair; a government bond; a 
metal; a commodity; and an aggregate index. In any 
one RWD experiment the intra-day price time-series 
at one-minute resolution for a specific asset on a 
specific date was read into BSE and then normalised 
on the time and price axes to give a LUT that could 
return a P0+ value at any point in the duration of the 
experiment, with prices in  the range [0, 80] for ease 
of comparison across the six different asset classes. 
In the results shown here, the RWD-Equity 
experiment uses prices of IBM stock on 08/31/17; 
RWD-FX uses price data for GBP-USD (i.e., 
“Cable”) on 09/11/17; RWD-Bond uses prices of the 
US Government 10yr Treasury Note on 09/12/17; 
RWD-Metal uses data for Copper on 09/12/17; 
RWD-Commodity uses spot Brent Crude Oil on 
15/29/18; and RWD-Index uses NASDAQ on 
09/13/17. In each case, 1-minute intraday price data 
was taken from the free samples available at the 
website of BacktestMarket.com; the date chosen for 
use in each asset class is simply the first date available 
in the BacktestMarket sample data, and hence is 
arbitrary. For each asset-class of RWD experiment 
we ran an exhaustive sweep where NEqR values were 
varied over the range [1,5] (i.e., markets with P=8, 
16, 24, 32, and 40 traders, always 50% buyers and 
50% sellers), where for each NEqR value all possible 
ratios R  of trading strategies were tested, and where 
for any specific (NEqR, R) combination we executed 
T=100 independent simulated market sessions. This 
required a total of 1,716,000 market simulations 
across the six asset classes. Figure 3 shows summary 
data from these experiments: as is clear, MAA is 
again the 3rd-ranked strategy, and again it performs 
significantly worse than either SHVR or ZIP. After 
viewing these results, there is no reasonable way that 
MAA can continue to be seriously considered as the 
best-performing published strategy.   
 
Figure 3 Summary of results from RWD experiments across 
six asset classes: this chart summarises results from 
1,716,000 separate market sessions. Horizontal axis is 
average profit per trader (APPT). Results are grouped by 
asset-class, with group-numbers on the vertical axis.  Group 
1 (at bottom) are from bond-price experiments; Group 2 are 
from commodity-price; Group 3 from equity-price; Group 
4 from metal-price; Group 5 from FX prices; and Group 6 
from index prices. Bars show mean APPT with error-bars 
indicating plus and minus one standard deviation. 
6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
The results in Figure 1 and Table 1 confirm what 
anyone familiar with the CDA trading-agent literature 
would reasonably claim to already know: AA, when 
appropriately modified to work in a LOB-based 
 CDA, and when tested in the kind of simple market 
environment as has traditionally been used in the 
literature, scores just as well as well-known other 
trading strategies and is not dominated by them.  
But the results in Figure 3 blow a major hole in the 
status quo: merely by altering the nature of the market 
environment to have continuous stochastic 
replenishment (which is surely what happens in real 
markets) and to have the equilibrium price P0 
continuously varying over time (which is also surely 
what happens in real markets), the results we get from 
MAA are very poor indeed. On the basis of these 
results, it is manifestly no longer correct to claim that 
AA/MAA is the best-performing trading strategy 
known in the published literature. How well the 
previous title-holder, i.e. GDX, fares in RWD 
experiments is an obvious line of further enquiry.  
It seems very hard to avoid the conclusion that AA’s 
success as reported in previous papers is largely due 
to the extent to which its internal mechanisms are 
designed to fit exactly the kind of experiment settings 
first introduced by Vernon Smith: AA is very well 
suited to situations in which all assignments are 
issued to all traders simultaneously, and in which the 
equilibrium price remains constant for sustained 
periods of time, with only occasional step-change 
“shocks”. Real markets are not like this, and when 
AA is deployed in the more realistic market setting 
provided by BSE, its dominance disappears.  
But surely the broader lesson here is that we should 
not allow ourselves to be seduced by results from 
small-scale studies in minimally simple 
approximations to real-world markets. Smith 
developed his experimental methods in the late 
1950’s when there were no realistic alternative ways 
of doing things. Running experiments with human 
subjects is laborious and slow, but experiments in 
electronic markets populated entirely by robot traders 
can proceed in appropriate simulators at speeds much 
faster than real-time, and are “embarrassingly 
parallelizable”: the experiments reported in this paper 
took a couple of weeks; if I’d used more virtual 
machines they could have been done in a couple of 
days or even in a couple of hours.  
   At this point in time, 20% of our way into the 21st 
Century, surely trading-agent researchers should 
collectively abandon the simple minimal test-beds 
that worked well for Vernon Smith in the middle of 
the 20th Century and instead start to tolerate the minor 
inconvenience of running very large numbers of trials 
on reasonably accurate simulations of realistic market 
situations: the methods used here should be the norm, 
not the exception. The availability of open-source 
public-domain exchange simulators such as BSE, 
OpEx, and ExPo, coupled with readily available 
cheap cloud-computing for doing the necessary 
processing, means that there are now really no 
excuses for not doing so. 
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